MOMOH, Ibrahim

OSAZUWA, Anthony Ogbemudia

Abstract

This study examines whether China’s growing financial engagement in Africa constitutes “debt trap diplomacy” aimed at undermining African sovereignty. Within the Belt and Road Initiative framework, Chinese lending has expanded over the past two decades, funding infrastructure in transportation, energy, and telecommunications. Critics highlight non-transparent loan terms, collateral clauses, and rising debt distress as potential instruments of strategic leverage, while proponents argue that Chinese financing addresses urgent infrastructure gaps without the strict policy conditionalities of the IMF or World Bank. Using a comparative case study approach, the paper analyses selected African countries with significant Chinese credit exposure, focusing on loan structures, debt sustainability, restructuring experiences, and diplomatic alignment. Findings suggest that while elevated debt can constrain fiscal flexibility, evidence of systematic asset seizure or overt sovereignty erosion is limited. Outcomes are shaped by domestic political economy, African elites’ negotiating leverage, and the global debt architecture. China-Africa debt relations are best understood as multidimensional interactions involving strategic economic statecraft, developmental pragmatism, and African agency, rather than a uniform neo-imperial strategy. The study concludes that while Chinese loans contribute to rising debt burdens and occasionally constrain fiscal flexibility, there is limited evidence of systematic asset seizure, direct policy imposition, or overt sovereignty erosion.

   

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Published: 2026

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